Workshop – Aviation Safety Management

Orient Flights  will conduct a workshop on Aviation Safety Management (Flight Safety & SMS) on September 11, 2013, at Orient Flight Centre, Pondicherry.
Workshop is tailored for aviation safety practitioners responsible for the formation, implementation or expansion of an SMS within their organizations.
The workshop will provide basic SMS concepts while also covering safety risk management (hazards, risks and controls); human factors; reactive, proactive and predictive safety management tools and methods; positive safety culture; and SMS implementation overview. Those who attend workshop will understand the theory, principles and application of an SMS as well as ICAO requirements for implementation and DGCA guidance for operators and organizations.

Registration for workshop on Aviation Safety Management is open. You can get registered yourself online.

For Registration : http://trainingofpl.weebly.com/registration.html

Facebook event : https://www.facebook.com/events/161869554008854/

Review of aircraft records

 

The review of aircraft records shall confirm that the aircraft in its current configuration complies with the following: 

1. airframe, engine and propeller flying hours and flight cycles have been properly recorded, and;

2. all known defects have been corrected or, when applicable, carried forward in a controlled manner, and;

3. airworthiness directives up to the latest published issue, and;

4.Type certificate data sheet (by number and issue), and;

5. Maintenance programme, and 

6. Component service life limitations, and;

7. The valid weight and centre of gravity schedule reflecting the current configuration of the aircraft, and;

8. Part 21 for all modifications and repairs, and;

9. The current flight manual (to the latest revision status) including supplements, and; 

10. All maintenance has been released in accordance with Part 145, and;

11. Operational requirements.

 

DGCA/NEW-MISC/153

SUBJECT – Equipment and furnishing – Hoist – Inspection replacement

During a maintenance check flight with a MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopter, a dummy load of 552 lbs (250kg) was picked up in order to conduct a “maximum load cycle” on the rescue hoist. The cable reeled-out without further command of the operator, causing the test dummy load to impact the ground.
The results of further examinations on the subject hoist determined that the overload clutch had failed. The overload clutch design is common to all Goodrich externally mounted rescue hoists listed in Appendix 1 of
EASA AD 2013-0065-E 
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to further cases of in-flight loss of the hoist load, possibly resulting in injury to persons on the ground or in a hoisting accident. For the reasons described above, this AD requires identification of the installed hoist and, for affected hoist installations, a one-time inspection and load check test of the externally mounted hoist.
Goodrich  is a world leader in developing, manufacturing, and supporting helicopter rescue hoist and aircraft cargo winch systems. Goodrich hoist and winch produces both traditional level wind and industry unique translating drum cable management systems. These types of hoist and winch technologies are used around the world for critical rescue missions and cargo handling by the U.S. and international coast guards, U.S. Army, foreign and domestic armed forces, and paramilitary forces, such as police, firefighters, medical evacuation crews, and other local municipalities. Our rescue hoists have field proven success in high demand, extreme environment missions and have been instrumental in saving lives in several worldwide disaster relief efforts.

DGCA/Cessna 172/48

SUBJECT : This AD is prompted by report of chafing of new configuration of fuel line return assembly, which was caused by the fuel line assembly rubbing against the right steering tube assembly during rudder pedal actuation.
Reference FAA AD 2013-03-15 Cessna Aircraft Company:
(a) Effective Date : This AD is effective March 19, 2013.
(b) Affected : ADs None.
(c) Applicability : Cessna airplanes, certificated in any category:
(1) Model 172R, serial numbers (S/N) 17281573 through 17281616; and
(2) Model 172S, S/N l72S11074 through 172S11193.
(d) Subject : JASC/ATA Code 2820, Aircraft Fuel Distribution System.
(e) Unsafe Condition : This AD was prompted by reports of chafing of a new configuration of the fuel return line assembly, which was caused by the fuel return line assembly rubbing against the right steering tube assembly during rudder pedal actuation. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
(f) Compliance : Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.
(g) Inspect the Fuel Return Line Assembly
At whichever of the following compliance times that occurs later, inspect the fuel return line assembly (Cessna part number (P/N) 0516031-1) for damage following the Accomplishment Instructions section of Cessna Aircraft Company Service Bulletin SEB-28-01, dated September 21,2012.(1) At the next annual inspection after March 19, 2013 (the effective date of this AD);(2) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service (TIS) after March 19, 2013 (the effective date of this AD); or(3) Within the next 12 calendar months after March 19, 2013 (the effective date of this AD).(h) Replace the Fuel Return Line Assembl          If you find evidence of damage of the fuel return line assembly (Cessna P/N 0516031-1) as a result of the inspection required by paragraph (g) of this AD, before further flight, replace the fuel return line assembly (Cessna P/N 0516031-1) following the Accomplishment Instructions section of Cessna Aircraft Company Service Bulletin SEB-28-01,  Sept 21, 2012.

(i) Install the Fuel Return Line Assembly If you find no evidence of damage of the fuel return line assembly (Cessna P/N 0516031-1) as a result of the inspection required by paragraph (g) of this AD, before further flight, reinstall the fuel return line assembly (Cessna P/N 0516031-1) following the Accomplishment Instructions section of Cessna  SB SEB-28-01,  Sept 21, 2012.
(j) Install Forward and Aft Fuel Return Line Support Clamps and Brackets
After installing the fuel return line assembly as required by replacement in paragraph (h) of this 
AD or installation in paragraph (i) of this AD, before further flight, install the forward and aft fuel return line support clamps and brackets following the Accomplishment Instructions section of Cessna  SEB-28-01, dated Sept 21, 2012.

(k) Inspect for a Minimum Clearance Between Certain Parts
After the installation required by paragraph (j) of this AD, before further flight, inspect for a 
minimum clearance between the following parts throughout the range of copilot pedal travel. The requirements of this AD take precedence over the actions required in the Accomplishment

Instructions section of Cessna Aircraft Company Service Bulletin SEB-28-01, dated September 21,2012:
(1) A minimum clearance of 0.5 inch between the fuel return line assembly (Cessna P/N
0516031-1) and the steering tube assembly (Cessna P/N MC0543022-2C); and
(2) Visible positive clearance between the fuel return line assembly (Cessna P/N 0516031-1) and the airplane structure.
(l) Adjust Clearance for Fuel Return Line Assembly
If you find any clearance less than the minimum clearance required by paragraph (k) of this AD,before further flight, adjust to the minimum clearance required by paragraph (k) of this AD.

Aircraft Tie-down Removal

CAA issued this Safety Notice is to re-emphasise to pilots the need to fully complete preflight checks, and specifically to ensure that the aircraft is free from tie-down constraints before being manoeuvred.
Recent reports submitted through the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme concern aircraft being taxied, and in one case taking off, with tie-down restraints still attached. In all cases these involved rope attachments to bulky objects such as weighted tyres and concrete blocks. All of the aircraft involved were light single-engine piston, low-wing types where the wing tie-down attachment points were hidden from the cockpit. In addition to the hazard to normal controlled flight, some of the reports featured damage to the wing-flaps and superficial damage to the runway surface. It seems to have been almost impossible to detect from the control responses and power settings required to taxi that there was anything untoward, despite the same bulky objects being difficult to move by hand when unattached.

Effective Precautions

Whilst these type of tie-down incidents do occur (as do similar incidents involving the nose-gear tow-bar), they are all easily preventable and have an established procedure in the pre-flight inspection to deal with them. It is essential to ensure that the pre-flight inspection is carried out thoroughly each time rather than being curtailed due to time pressures, distraction or a reluctance to get clothes or hands dirty. In order to make an effective check the pilot must put himself/herself in a position where the item being checked can be positively verified including, in these situations, getting under the wing to check the lower surfaces, fuselage, undercarriage and tie-down points. It is clearly important to inspect directly the tie-down attachment point to see that it is clear, rather than rely on the rope, cable or anchor being clearly visible. 

However, since experience indicates that the way pre-flight checks are carried out does not always identify a tie-down still in place, owners and pilots may wish to consider additional measures. These measures include, but are not limited to:

• Regular use of a written checklist is the best way to ensure that items are not forgotten. If the checks have become so familiar that the pilot feels no need to use the list normally, the pilot should make an effort to use the list regularly to refresh his/her memory of the detail of the items. 

• Attempting to ensure that the aircraft cannot move with a tie-down attached. A substantial chock in front of a wheel which is also attached to the anchoring object may achieve this. 

• Attaching the aircraft to a ground anchor rather than a moveable object. While aircraft have been known to break the rope while taxiing forward, a rope-end is less likely to cause serious damage than a concrete block.  

• Having more than one ‘indicator’ that an item is satisfactory/not satisfactory, e.g. tags, markers, cones, etc. showing prominently when a tie-down is not attached. An ideal system of this type would have the tags/markers visible from the cockpit for final verification. If a mobile anchoring object is used, it is suggested that these, once unattached, are moved to an obvious place where they are not in the way but can be seen from the cockpit. 

• Encouraging all persons on the aerodrome to take an interest in aircraft taxiing and to raise the alert if something untoward is noticed. If available, communicate the nature of the problem via the aerodrome ATS or the notified frequency for the aerodrome if the incident happens outside of normal operating hours.  

• Dress sensibly during winter months so that you can comfortably carry out pre-flight checks (including removing all ice) without feeling the need to curtail them due to cold and inclement weather or saturated ground. If you hire an aircraft, don’t only rely on the daily ‘A’ check or the previous pilot having carried out a full pre-flight inspection.